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At the heart of any court-martial lies the requirement of
jurisdiction - the power of a court to try and determine a case
and to render a valid judgement. The courts, in referring to the
nature of courts-martial, often label them as "creatures of
statute," 1 a phrase which sets the appropriate tone for any
discussion of courts-martial jurisdiction.
Two of the numerous constitutional questions about which the
Constitution itself tells us very little are the extent to which
persons who are not active duty members of the armed forces may
be subjected to trial by courts-martial, and for what offenses.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have addressed these questions,
but the question as to the outer limits of courts-martial
jurisdiction remains unanswered. Although the Constitution does
not clearly answer these questions, an understanding of the
constitutional basis for courts-martial is necessary.
The U. S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14,
provides that Congress has the power "To make rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". This
power is augmented by the "necessary and proper" clause which
gives Congress the power to enact all legislation necessary to
exercise the powers specifically granted to it. 2 It was pursuant
Mcqaughry y, Peming, 186 u.s. 49 (1902)
U.S. Const. Art.l, Sec. 8, cl.18.

2to these grants of power that Congress enacted the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, which defines the classes of individuals
subject to that Code and therefore subject to trial by courts-
martial . 3
The powers vested in Congress by Clauses 14 and 18 of
Article I, Section 8, are not unlimited, however. Any action
Congress takes in the exercise of its enumerated powers must also
conform to the limitations set in the Constitution itself, and
any action taken by Congress which oversteps these limitations is
void.* Foremost among these constitutional limitations is that
of the doctrine of separation of powers. As noted by the Supreme
Court, the Framers of the Constitution saw the accumulation of
all governmental powers in the same hands as tyranny.® For this
reason the Constitution vests governmental powers in three
distinct, yet interdependent, branches. This separation, and the
checks and balances which result, is "a self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other.""
The Constitutional status of courts-martial, however, is
significantly different from that of an Article III Federal
3 18 U.S.C. 801-940.
A Marbury v. Madison . 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, (1803).
8 Wocthern Pipeline Construction co, y, Marathon Pipe Line
Co.
,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) .
s Buckley v. Valeo . 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).

3court. Courts-martial are "legislative" or "Article I" courts. 7
Thus, they derive their power, not from the provisions of Article
III, but from the Congressional power "to make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and
conferred by Article I, Section 8, clause 14 of the
Constitution. 8
Courts-martial are not an arm of the judicial branch of
government established by Article III, but an arm of the
executive branch.® The executive power of the Federal
Government is vested in the office of the President, who, as the
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, is
statutorily empowered to convene courts-martial. The President
has delegated this power to the service secretaries and certain
military officers inferior in the chain of command. 10
By creating Article I courts, Congress may constitutionally
confer judicial powers upon the executive branch in execution of
the powers expressly granted it by the Constitution. In doing
so, Congress must keep the constitutional scheme in mind. To
give Article I, Section 8, clause 14 its natural reading,
7 Gosa v. Mavden. 413 U.S. 665, 686 (1973); Parl sl y.
Davidson . 405 U.S. 34, 40-41 (1972). Since 1949, numerous bills
have been introduced in Congress proposing that the Court of
Military Appeals be made an Article III court. All of these
attempts have failed. A similar bill currently pending in
Congress is also predicted to fail.
a Palmore v. United States
, 411 U.S. 389, 404 (1973).
9 Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 49 (1920 Reprint).
10 U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1-2; UCMJ Articles 22, 23, 24
(10 U.S.C. 822, 823, 824)
.

4Congress must restrict courts-martial to the exercise of "the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 13- The
reason for this is obvious, "as any expansion of courts-martial
jurisdiction necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution". 12




the Constitutional scheme, civilian courts are the normal
repositories of the power to try persons for offenses against the
United States; military tribunals exercise a very limited and
extraordinary jurisdiction intended to be a very narrow exception
to the preferred method of trial in civilian courts. 1 *
The most obvious litmus test for military jurisdiction,
which the Supreme Court adopted early on, is a "status" test.
Taking its lead from the Constitution's express grants of power
to Congress and the President to govern, administer, and command
"the land and naval forces," and the Fifth Amendment's exclusion
of "cases arising in the land or naval forces" from the
indictment and jury trial guarantees, the Supreme Court first
focused on an individual's military status, or the lack of such
status, in determining whether courts-martial have proper
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Congressional extensions of




13 354 U.S. 1 (1857)
1 * Id. at 21

5jurisdiction in certain cases over ex-servicemen and civilians,
the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the class of individuals
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice in peacetime to
those persons who can fairly be termed "members of the land and
naval forces". In doing so, the Court has held the following
exercises of jurisdiction unconstitutional: the court-martial of
an honorably discharged serviceman who has severed all connection
with the service; 16 the court-martial, pursuant to a status of
forces agreement, of dependents accompanying service persons
overseas; 16 and the court-martial of civilian employees of the
military establishment serving overseas. 17 In each of these
cases the Court focused on the jurisdictional question in terms
of membership in the armed forces. As none of the accused in
those cases was a member of the armed forces, the Court
concluded that the purported extension of courts-martial
jurisdiction over them was impermissible.
As these cases involved defendants who were unquestionably
civilians, with no ties to the military establishment, it was
quite natural for the Court to focus on membership vel non in the
armed forces as the litmus test of military jurisdiction. The
adoption of this status test, while providing a clear, workable
rule concerning one group of persons brought under military
1B United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles . supra note 11.
lc Reld v, Cove rt, 354 u.s. l (1857); Klnsella y, United
States ex rel. Singleton
,
361 U.S. 234 (1960).
17
c-rlsham v, Hagen, 361 u.s. 278 (i960); HcElcoy v. United
states ex rel, c-ua gUda rdo, 361 u.s. 281 (i960).

6jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Code, served to
confuse the issue with respect to others. While the Court may
make it clear that civilians may not be courts-mart ialed in
peacetime, it hasn't provided a clear definition of who is a
"civilian." While it is clear that active duty members of the
armed forces are not civilians, what about retirees and
reservists? Equally unclear is the jurisdiction over discharged
servicemembers . While Toth held the courts-martial jurisdiction
over discharged servicemembers unconstitutional, 10 the current
validity of that holding is questionable and will be the subject
of further discussion.
In the area of subject matter jurisdiction, we have recently
seen the United States Supreme Court in Solorlo v. United
States, 19 overrule the landmark case of Q'Callahan v, Parker/ 20
which permitted only offenses which were "service connected" to
be tried by courts-martial. This significant expansion of
subject matter jurisdiction, coupled with the uncertain
limitations on personal jurisdiction continues to leave open the
question as to the outer limits of courts-martial jurisdiction.
The expansive effect of the Solorio decision does not stop with
the issue of service connection.
While Solorio may resolve numerous issues regarding service
18 See supra note 11.
19 Solorio v. United States . 483 U.S. , 107 S. Ct . 2924
(1987)
.
20 O'Callahan v. Parker
, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).

7connection, it raises many new questions. Does Solor lo have
retroactive application? Does the Court's reliance on the
"status" of the accused as the basis for courts-martial
jurisdiction entirely eliminate the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction? Does the "status" test expand jurisdiction beyond
that which existed prior to ' Callahan , or does it simply return
courts-martial jurisdiction to pre ' Callahan status? What are
the classes of persons who have "status" as members of the land
and naval forces? With over five and a half million people who
may be considered to have some "status" as members of the land
and naval forces, and therefore subject to courts-martial
jurisdiction, 21 what are the ramifications of this expansion?
Does Solorio go too far in expanding jurisdiction and, if so,
what should be done about it? This paper will explore and
analyze these issues in an attempt to predict the outer limits of
courts-martial jurisdiction as well as make recommendations for




Pursuant to the powers granted it by the Constitution,
21 Figures obtained from the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs show the
following numbers of personnel in each category as of the end of
fiscal year 1987: Active Duty - 2,163,582; Reserve - 1,675,834;




8Congress established the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
"provide a single, unified, consolidated and codified system of
criminal law and judicial procedure equally applicable to all of
the armed forces of the United States." 22 It was Congress* aim
in establishing the Code that there be uniformity in substance
and uniformity in interpretation and construction. 23 The Code
was to balance maximum military performance and maximum justice
within the armed forces. 2 *
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit recognized that the reason Congress established
a separate system of justice for the military was grounded on the
rationale that the world wide deployment of large numbers of
military personnel with unique disciplinary requirements mandated
a flexible and separate jurisprudence capable of operating in
times of peace or conflict. 23
It is important to keep in mind the congressional purpose
and aims in establishing the Code in 1950 when analyzing the
current statutes, court decisions and practices of each of the
armed services.
22 See enacting clause of Pub. L. No. 506, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (May 5, 1950), 64 Stat. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. 551-736.
23 See House Report of Pub. L. No. 506, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (May 5, 1950), 64 Stat. 108 (1950).
24 Id.




An accurate understanding of the history of courts-martial
jurisdiction is essential in determining the proper limits of
courts-martial today. The Supreme Court has blamed the "less
than accurate" reading of the history of courts-martial
jurisdiction as the underlying cause of uncertainty concerning
it's jurisdictional limits. 2C
The history of our military law is older than the nation
itself; older than our Constitution. The provisions of our
original Articles of War were taken directly from the British
system in order to provide a justice and discipline system for
our military. The British rules were adopted by the Continental
Congress in the first American Articles of War of 1775, where the
different courts-martial (General, Regimental, and detachment or
Garrison courts) were distinguished, and their composition and
jurisdiction defined. a>7 John Adams presented these Articles to
the Continental Congress "with the least energy," expecting them
to be changed substantially or rejected totally. 28 Adams later
wrote
:
"There was extant, I observed, one system of Articles of
War which had carried two empires to the head of mankind,
4 .
26 Solorio v. United States , supra note 19.
27 Winthrop, supra note 9.
28 Ansell, Military Justice
,
5 Cornell L.Q., Nov. 1919, at
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the Roman and the British; for the British Articles of War
are only a literal translation of the Roman. It would be in
vain for us to seek in our own invention or the records of
warlike nations for a more complete system of military
discipline. I was, therefore, for reporting the British
Articles of War totidem verbis ... So undigested were the
notions of liberty prevalent among the majority of the
members most zealously attached to the public cause that to
this day I scarcely know how it was possible that these
articles should have been carried." 29
After adoption by the Continental Congress, the provisions
were modified and enlarged in the succeeding Articles of 1776 and
1786. 3 ° At the time of the Constitution, that instrument
authorized Congress to provide for the government of the army and
to institute courts-martial, but by the operation of the Act of
September 29, 1789, the Articles continued in existence as
previously established. Not only did these Articles adopt the
language verbatim from the British Articles, but the language
remained virtually unchanged with respect to jurisdiction until
the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950. 31
The ' Callahan Court found support for its opinion limiting
courts-martial jurisdiction to offenses which were service
29 Id. at 3-4.
30 Wlnthrop, supra note 9.
3 1 UCMJ, ch 169, 64 Stat. 108 (1950).
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connected in the lav of England prior to the American Revolution,
and in American history. The Court referred to the abuses of
courts-martial power as "an important grievance of the
parliamentary forces in the English constitutional crises of the
17th Century," finally resulting in Parliament's, and not the
Crown's, holding the power to define courts-martial
jurisdiction. 32 Justice Douglas, in writing for the Court in
Q'Callahan
r
insisted that the 17th Century conflict was not
merely a struggle over which organ of government had
jurisdiction, but "involved substantive disapproval of the
general use of military courts for trial of ordinary crimes. 1133
He acknowledged that the Mutiny Act of 1720 allowed courts-
martial for common law felonies, but treated the Act as an
exception to the British rule "at the time of the American
Revolution that a soldier could not be tried by courts-martial
for a civilian offense committed in Britain. " 3 't
For centuries prior to the first Mutiny Act of 1689, the
Crown, by special commission, empowered the leaders of the armies
with martial law. As noted by one historian,
"[Wle find very terrible powers of summary justice granted
to the constable. In 1462 Edward IV empowers him to proceed
in all crimes of treason 'summarily and plainly, without




supra note 20 at 26
33 Id.
3 * Id. at 269.
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fact. . . ." They show something like a contempt for law--
the constable is to exercise powers of almost unlimited
extent, all statutes, ordinances, acts and restrictions to
the contrary notwithstanding." 35
In 1627, Parliament objected, inter alia, to the conduct of
Charles I in issuing commissions for courts-martial law against
soldiers and mariners in time of peace, and adopted the Petition
of Rights of 1627. Charles I agreed to their demands and revoked
the commissions. However, after the Restoration, both Charles II
and James II published articles of war for governing their
troops, and in 1688, the Articles of War of James II provided for
the courts-martial of soldiers for common law crimes. 3 '
With the coming of the English Revolution and William and
Mary to the throne, the authority to control the Army was
securely vested in Parliament by the Crown's acceptance of the
Bill of Rights. Under the Act, courts-martial jurisdiction was
limited to only three offenses. 37 Later, in section 46 of the
Mutiny Act of 1720, Parliament authorized the courts-mart ial ing
of soldiers in Britain for common law felonies, if within eight
days, the civilian authorities did not demand the turnover of the
accused soldier to them for trial. A year later, that section
was changed so that courts-martial jurisdiction did not include
3S Winthrop, supra note 9 at 46-47.
3C Articles of War of James II, reprinted in Winthrop,
supra note 9.
37 Id. at 18-19.

13
common law offenses committed in Britain. The action of
Parliament suggests nothing conclusive. The continuing changes
to the Mutiny Acts suggests that Parliament determined the limits
of jurisdiction based upon what was expedient at the time, and
the later restriction of jurisdictional limits merely reflected
that the broader limits were no longer considered necessary.
There was clearly a dispute over which organ of government
had jurisdiction over the Army; and further, there was a
disapproval of military law, in that it was arbitrary and alien
to established legal principles.
The United States Supreme Court most recently has held that
the authority to try servicemembers for civilian crimes is found
in the "general article" of the 1776 Articles of War, 38 adopted
from the British Rules, which states that:
"All crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects
which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the
prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not
mentioned in the above articles of war, are to be taken
cognizance of by a general or regimental court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offence, and be
punished at their discret ion . " 3 *
This same provision, however, was interpreted by the
O'Callahan Court as limiting courts-martial jurisdiction to
38 SQlvrlQ V. United States, supra note 19.
38 American Articles of War of 1776, Section XVIII, Article
5, reprinted in Winthrop, supra note 9.
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crimes that had a direct impact on military discipline. 40
The ambiguity of the historical precedents and limitations
on courts-martial jurisdiction contained in the Constitution have
since been the subject of much debate in the Congress and in the
courts .
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Since the American Revolution, the military has been given
broad discretion in dealing with its personnel in matters
relating to military justice. 41 The Supreme Court of the United
States, as early as 1863, recognized the importance of the
military's exercise of jurisdiction over its personnel and,
consequently, the Court traditionally has refrained from
«
involvement in cases where the military establishment has dealt
with its own personnel. 42 The system of military justice in the
40 O'Callahan v. Parker , supra note 20. While courts-
martial subject matter jurisdiction is limited to those offenses
specifically enumerated in the UCMJ, Article 134, UCMJ, (the
general article) extends subject matter jurisdiction to all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital. The term "crimes and offenses not capital" includes
those acts or omissions, not made punishable by another article
under the UCMJ which are denounced as noncapital crimes or
offenses which violate Federal law, including law made applicable
through the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. (Paragraph 60(c)(1),
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984).
4i See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military . 37
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181 at 187 (1962).
42 Ex parte Vallandlqham
,
68 U.S. (1 Wall) 243 (1863).
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United States has been based upon the understanding that Article
I, Section 8, clause 14 and the exceptions in the fifth amendment
empowered Congress to establish rules for discipline for members
"in the land and naval forces". Military status had long been
recognized as the jurisdictional test and it had been held that
"to say that military jurisdiction 'defies definition in terms of
military status 1 is to defy unambiguous language of Article 1,
section 8, clause 14.
"
43
Recent history with regard to subject-matter jurisdiction
for courts-martial starts with the year 1969, when the Supreme
Court decided O'Callahan v. Parker . The facts in the O'Callahan
case are significant. 44 In July 1956, O'Callahan was stationed
at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. One evening that July, O'Callahan and a
friend, both dressed in civilian clothes, left the post and went
into Honolulu. After a few drinks at a Honolulu hotel bar,
O'Callahan entered the residential section of the hotel and broke
into the room of a 14-year-old girl. O'Callahan attempted to
rape the young girl, who resisted and screamed for help.
O'Callahan then fled the room and was apprehended by a hotel
security guard who released him to the Honolulu police. Upon
learning that O'Callahan was a service member, the police
returned him to military authorities. He was subsequently tried
and convicted by a general court-martial and sentenced to a
43 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton , supra note
16.
44 Supra note 20.
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dishonorable discharge, 10 years confinement at hard labor, and
forfeiture of all pay and allowances.
While serving confinement, O'Callahan filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging that the court-
martial did not have jurisdiction to try him for nonmilitary
offenses committed off post while on an evening pass. The
district court denied relief on the ground that the accused
previously had petitioned the federal district court in
Massachusetts and had received an unfavorable ruling. 43 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
decision of the lower court. 46
On appeal of the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the following question:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, have
jurisdiction to try a member of the Armed Forces who is
charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian
court and having no military significance, alleged to have
been committed off-post and while on leave, thus depriving
him of his constitutional rights to indictment by a grand
jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court? -47
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-three decision, denied the
* s United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker . 256 F.Supp.
679 (M.D. Pa. 1966) .
* c United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker . 390 F.2d 360
(3d Cir. 1968) .
*'7 O'Callahan v. Parker , supra note 20 at 261.
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court-martial jurisdiction, holding that the offenses for which
O'Callahan was charged were not service connected and reversed
the decision of the lower courts. Justice Douglas, in writing
for the majority, sharply criticized military courts as being
"singularly inept at dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law.'"48 Courts-martial, he opined, are primarily
instruments of discipline rather than justice. The Court noted
that military justice does not afford an accused the right to a
trial by jury or the right to indictment by a grand jury; rights
which are guaranteed by the United States Constitution except in
cases "arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger. "•* 9
Courts-martial, being a "specialized part of the overall
mechanism by which military discipline is preserved," 30 were, in
the Court's view, not fora which should have unlimited federal
jurisdiction. Rather, their jurisdiction should afford "the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 51 In
military law cases, the least possible jurisdictional power
necessary to fulfill the function of maintaining good order and
discipline in the land and naval forces was, in the Court's
view, the power to try cases that were service connected.
Although service connection was not exhaustively defined in
+* Id. at 265.
** Id. at 261.
BO Id. at 265.
31 Id. quoting Toth v. Quarles , 350 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1955)
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| Callahan , it was noted that courts-martial jurisdiction existed
in cases where there was a "flouting of military authority, the




Justice Douglas noted that O'Callahan was off post, off
duty, and dressed in civilian clothing at the time of the
offense. He also pointed out that the offenses were perpetrated
against a civilian victim and were of no military significance,
having been committed during peacetime "within our territorial
limits, not in the occupied zone of a foreign country.
"
s3
In following Justice Black's observation in United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles ** that "[flree countries of the world have
tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest
jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining
discipline among the troops in active service . . .", BB Justice
Douglas advanced historical arguments that trying soldiers
charged with civilian offenses in military courts was unpopular
with the American colonists. Justice Douglas stated that the
Continental Congress, in passing the Articles of War, intended
that specific enumerated crimes were expected to be tried in
civilian courts. 5 * Unfortunately, he recognized that the
52 Id. at 274.
53 Id. at 273-4.
** 350 U.S. 11 (1955) .
5B Id. at 22.
56 395 U.S. at 270-271.
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application of the intent of the Continental Congress was not
followed consistently. Nevertheless, Justice Douglas stated that
some court-martial convictions were set aside on review where the
charges failed to state a military offense, but did state a
civilian offense. an
Justice Douglas also noted that, during the Civil War,
Congress passed a law making certain civil offenses triable by
courts-martial, "in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion." 58
Additionally, he cited provisions in the Articles of War, revised
in 1916, and the extension of military jurisdiction to capital
crimes committed by persons subject to military law in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, to support the argument
that, historically, Americans were suspicious of trying military
personnel who had committed civilian offenses.
In dissent, Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and
White, argued that Congress has been granted the power to
determine the "appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-
57 Id. In an appendix to the Government's brief over 100
instances where military punishment was recorded for non-
military crimes tried between 1775 and 1815 was listed. Justice
Douglas asserted that "tiln almost every case summarized, it
appears that some special military interest existed." He
referred to crimes which were peculiarly military: "prosecutions
for abusing military position"; crimes Involving officers; and
courts-martial held in wartime between 1773 and 1783, as having
military significance. He disqualified the rest of the cases
which did not fall into one of the above categories by saying
there were not sufficient facts presented to decide, or "perhaps'
the case fell into the category designated as "abusing military
position." Justice Douglas' approach to discredit the




martial" 9 ' and not the courts. The dissent further noted the
inconsistencies in the majority opinion and pointed out the
weaknesses in the historical arguments relied upon to support the
majority opinion. While opining that the English Constitution
and the pertinent United States history tended to support the
position of the dissent, Justice Harlan argued that such examples
were hardly conclusive or persuasive authority for supporting the
holding of the majority. 60
The Supreme Court provided specific guidelines when it
further developed the service-connection rule in Relford v.
Commandant . gl Although the Relford case was tried over five
years prior to O'Callahan . the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
limited to the scope and retroactivity of the O'Callahan
decision. 62 In Relf ord f the accused was in civilian clothes and
on leave when he forced his way into two automobiles on a
military installation and kidnapped and raped his victims. In
upholding courts-martial jurisdiction over the offenses, and
finding Relford's conduct to be "obviously service connected," 63
the Court established the now well-known and often-cited twelve
Relford factors:
1. Whether the accused was properly away from his base when
59 Id. at 276
so Id.
61 401 U.S. 355 (1971)
.
62 Id. at 359.
63 Id. at 369.
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the offense was committed;
2. Whether the offense was committed off base;
3. Whether the offense was committed within an area not
within military control;
4. Whether it was committed within the territorial United
States and not in an occupied foreign zone;
5. Whether it was committed during time of peace and
without reference to the war-making power;
6 Whether it was unrelated to the accused's military
duties;
7. Whether the victim was engaged in a military duty;
8. Whether the offense was among the crimes normally
processed in the civilian courts, and there is no
indication of unavailability of civil courts to
try them;
9. Whether it was unrelated to military authority and
involved no flouting of military authority;
10. Whether it involved a threat to a military post;
11. Whether there was any violation of military property;
and
12. Whether the offense was normally civilian, and not
military in nature. 6 *
Although there are some purely military offenses for which
jurisdiction will always vest, such as missing movement,
unauthorized absences, and the flouting of military orders and
* Id. at 365.

22
authority, 8 ' the Court decided, in most cases, to apply these
jurisdictional factors on a case-by-case, ad hoc, basis. ss The
Court noted that this ad hoc approach "leaves outer boundaries
undetermined." 6 '7 The decisions of the Court of Military Appeals
and the United States Supreme Court since O'Callahan and Relf ord
have attempted to better define these outer boundaries.
Since the O'Callahan decision, the former Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Military Appeals, Robinson 0. Everett, has
been critical of the Supreme Court's limitations on courts-
martial jurisdiction. He observed that "the majority opinion in
' Callahan must be viewed as a triumph of abstract concept over
practical realities." 60
Despite widespread criticism, the limits of courts-martial
jurisdiction were not significantly pressed again until the 1980
case of United States v Trottier . 69 Airman Trottier was tried by
a general court-martial for selling marijuana and LSD at an off-
base location in Oxon Hill, Maryland."70 The court in Trottier
favorably cited United States v. Beeker . 71 stating that "use or
SB Id. at 364.
ec Id. at 365.
67 Id. at 369.
ss Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker - Milestone or Millstone in
Military Justice? . 1969 Duke L.J. 853.
69 9 M.J. 337 (CMA 1980) .
70 Id. at 338.




possession of marijuana and narcotics, whether on or off post,
'has singular military significance which carries the act outside
the limitation on military jurisdiction set out in the O'Callahan
case.'"'72 Referencing the war powers clause of the
Constitution, 73 the court acknowledged that the Constitution was
a flexible instrument, capable of accommodating society's
changing needs. The Trottier court extended courts-martial
jurisdiction to most drug cases regardless of whether the offense
occurred on or off a military installation. 7 "* The court carved
out two narrow exceptions to universal jurisdiction in drug
cases; use of marijuana by a servicemember while on a lengthy
period of leave away from the military community, and the off-
base sale of a small amount of drugs to a civilian for the
civilian's personal use.
In 1981, the Court of Military Appeals further expanded
jurisdiction in United States v. Lockwood
,
7S This case involved
the question of courts-martial jurisdiction over larceny and
forgery charges which, although initiated on base, were
consummated in a civilian jurisdiction. Airman Basic Roger
Lockwood stole a military identification card on base, then used
the card to fraudulently obtain an off-base loan, giving rise to
72 Id. at 340.
73 U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl . 14.
74 9 M.J. 350-353.
7B 15 M.J. 1 (CM. A. 1983) .
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the contested larceny and forgery charges. 78 The Court of
Military Appeals concluded that courts-martial jurisdiction
attached to the off-base crimes because they were part of M a
course of conduct which began on base" and impacted on "the
morale, reputation, and integrity of the base itself." 7 '7 The
court further stated that:
"{Service connection} turns in major part on gauging the
impact of an offense on military discipline and
effectiveness, and determining whether the military interest
in deterring the offense is distinct from and greater than
that of civilian society, and on whether the distinct
military interest can be vindicated adequately in civilian
courts. These are matters of judgement that often turn on
the precise set of facts in which the offense has
occurred . ,,7 °
The Lockwood court reexamined Justice Douglas' negative
comments in ' Callahan concerning the problems and abuses of
military courts, and noted that these problems had been
significantly curtailed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and by passage of the Military Justice Act of 1968. The court
put forth that there should be periodic reexaminations of
service connection in light of changes in the military mission
76 Id. at 3.
77 Id. at 10.
78 Id. at 4, quoting Schlesinoer v. Councilman . 420 U.S.
738, 756 (1975) .
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and the impact of off-base offenses on the ability to perform
these missions. 79
In 1987 the case of Solorio v. United States 80 gave the
Court the opportunity to reexamine service connection and better
define the limits of courts-martial jurisdiction. Like
' Callahan
,
an understanding of the facts of this case is
necessary to appreciate the impact of this decision. Solorio was
an active duty Coast Guard yeoman first class petty officer
stationed in Juneau, Alaska when he sexually abused two young
daughters of fellow Coast Guardsmen over a two year period. He
was subsequently transferred by the Coast Guard to Governors
Island, New York. After his transfer, Coast Guard authorities
learned of his prior acts in Alaska and also found that he had
committed similar sexual offenses in New York after his transfer.
The Governors Island Commander convened a general court-martial
to try Petty Officer Solorio for the offenses committed in both
Alaska and New York. Fourteen specifications arose from the
alleged off-base misconduct in Juneau, Alaska, and seven
specifications arose from alleged subsequent misconduct at
Governors Island, New York. As there is no "post" or "base"
where Coast Guard personnel live and work in Juneau, most Coast
Guard personnel stationed there reside in the civilian community.
The Alaska offenses were committed in the accused's privately
owned home, and the fathers of the victims in Alaska were active
7 * Id. at 10.
so Supra note 19
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duty members of the same Coast Guard unit as the accused. The
victims of the New York offenses were also daughters of fellow
Coast Guardsmen but the offenses were committed in government
quarters on the Governors Island base.
The trial judge in Solor io granted a defense motion to
dismiss the Alaska offenses on the ground that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, citing the decisions in ' Callahan
and Relf ord . ei The Government appealed this dismissal to the
United States Coast Guard Court of Military Review, which




In reviewing the subsequent conviction, the United States
Court of Military Appeals affirmed the Court of Military Review,
concluding that the Alaska offenses were service connected within
the meaning of O'Callahan and Relf ord . a3 The court took an
expansive ad hoc approach in holding that courts-martial
jurisdiction attached to the Alaska offenses. Although the court
cited several of the Relf ord factors, the decision was based on
the modern concern of the effect of crimes on their victims. The
court reasoned that "sex offenses against young children . . .
have a continuing effect on the victims and their families and
ultimately on the morale of any military unit or organization to
81 United States v. Solorio , 21 M.J. 512 (C.G.C.M.R.
1985) .
° 2 Id.
83 United States v. Solorio , 21 M.J. 256 ( CMA 1986).
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which the family member is ass igned .
"
e * The court considered the
issue of prosecution of the Alaska offenses in a civilian court
and found such prosecution to be unlikely. The victims and their
families had been transferred a great distance from Alaska and
the state of Alaska had agreed to defer prosecution to the
military. The court noted that the likelihood of rehabilitation
would be small if two trials were pending as a result of
separating on-base and off-base offenses. Where related on-base
and off-base offenses are involved, there is M a military interest
in having all of the offenses tried by court-martial so that they
can be disposed of without delay, and this . . . helps provide a
basis for finding service connection for the off-base
of f enses . ,,aB By considering the Relf ord factors, the continuing
effects of the offenses, the improbability of civilian
prosecution, and the appropriateness of joining related offenses
together at one trial, the court concluded that service
connection did exist.
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to review
the decision of the Court of Military Appeals and affirmed in a
six to three decision. The Supreme Court did not base it's
decision on an analysis of whether the offenses were service
connected, but rather, overruled ' Callahan , and revived the
traditional jurisdictional test by holding that "[tine
jurisdiction of a court-martial depends solely on the accused's
aA Id.
85 Id. at 257.
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status as a member of the Armed Forces, and not on the 'service
connection' of the offense charged. " <ss
In overruling the landmark case of O'Callahan . the Court
sharply criticized the ' Callahan Court's representation of the
history of courts-martial jurisdiction as being "less than
accurate". The O'Callahan court had taken the position that
"[i]t was . . . the rule in Britain at the time of the
American Revolution that a soldier could not be tried for a
civilian offense committed in Britain; instead military
officers were required to use their energies and office to
insure that the accused soldier would be tried before a
civil court." 87
In writing for the majority in solorio
.
Chief Justice Rehnqulst
pointed out that the above position was not the sole statement in
the British Articles of War bearing on courts-martial
jurisdiction over civilian offenses. Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited Section XIV, Article XVI of the British Articles of War
which states that all officers and soldiers who:
"shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging
to any of Our Subjects, unless by Order of the then
Commander in Chief of Our Forces, to annoy Rebels or other
Enemies in Arms against Us, he or they that shall be found
es Solorio v. United States , see supra note 19. While the
offense no longer has to be service connected, it must be
specifically delineated in one of the articles of the UCMJ or
incorporated under Article 134, UCMJ as a crime or offense not
capital. (See supra note 40.)
87 Supra note 20 at 269 .
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guilty of offending herein shall (besides such Penalties as
they are liable to by lav) be punished according to the
Nature and Degree of the Offence, by the Judgement of a
Regimental or General Court Martial.
"
ao
Holding that this provision gives military tribunals jurisdiction
over offenses punishable under civil law, the Chief Justice
pointed out that the ' Callahan Court "erred in suggesting that,
at the time of the American Revolution, military tribunals in
England were available 'only where ordinary civil courts were
unavailable.'" 00 Justice Douglas' statement in O'Callahan that
early American practice supports the majority opinion is without
substance. He drew support for his statement from the Articles
of War of 1776, enacted by the Continental Congress: the works of
Colonel Winthrop, a noted military law historian; and the late
date of 1916, when specific civilian offenses were first made
punishable in peacetime courts-martial. 00 An examination of his
authorities leads to an opposite conclusion.
Section X, article 1 of the 1776 Articles of War, to which
Justice Douglas referred, only required the accused soldier to be
delivered to the civil magistrate for a civilian offense after a
request had been made for his delivery. The section immediately
preceding section X, article 1 assists in determining what course
of action must be taken by an Army commander, when no such
00 SqIqiIq v. United States/ see supra note 19.
ao Id.
9 O O'Callahan . supra note 20 at 271-272.
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request for delivery of the accused is received from the civilian
authorities. That section requires all commanding officers to
insure disciplinary action is taken against his officers and men
for various military and civilian type offenses; and should he
fail to see that justice is done, then he must stand courts-
martial for the crime committed by his subordinate. In those
cases where the civilian authorities did not request delivery of
the accused, the commander would be in personal jeopardy if he
did not take courts-martial action. In civilian type crimes, he
would charge the accused under the general article, which allowed
punishment for "[alll crimes not capital. . . ." a:L Surely an
article requiring cooperation and delivery of an accused to civil
authorities upon application did not limit courts-martial
jurisdiction when the civil application was not forthcoming.
Historical evidence indicates that civilian offenses were tried
by courts-martial.
Pointing to the confusion created by the O'Callahan decision
in attempting to determine if an offense is service connected,
along with the "doubtful foundations of O'Callahan " 92 , Chief
Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that "judicial deference ... is at
its apogee when legislative action under the congressional
authority to raise and support armies and make rules and
9i Brief for Respondent at 35-52, O'Callahan v. Parker ,




regulations for their governance is challenged."* 3
In holding that the plain meaning of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 14, of the Constitution supports the military status test,
which had been the standard prior to Q'Callahan f the Court held
"that the requirements of the Constitution are not violated where
. . . a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was a




This holding leaves open two important questions with
respect to courts-martial jurisdiction: Does Solorio entirely
eliminate the issue of subject matter jurisdiction?; and, Does
this holding effectively overrule Toth by allowing the courts-
martial of a discharged servicemember for crimes committed while
on active duty?
As indicated earlier, courts-martial subject matter
jurisdiction is limited to those offenses specifically delineated
under the UCMJ . This subject matter jurisdiction includes the
broad range of offenses which may be brought under the "general
article", Article 134. Under this article, offenses involving
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces, offenses involving conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and
93 id. quoting Goldman v, Weinberger, 475 u.s. 503 (1986);




offenses not capital' 9 may be tried by courts-martial. Subject
to these limitations, the Solor io Court eliminated the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction. To what extent the military
authorities will exercise this expanded authority remains to be
seen. A cautious, reasonable, and conservative approach by the
military may well avoid the possibility of Federal Court or
Congressional intervention in limiting this authority.
While the Solor io Court did not specifically overrule Toth
,
its concluding language might suggest that result. The strict
interpretation of the Solor io holding, however, should not be
readily applied, absent extraordinary circumstances, without
risking limiting intervention by the Federal Courts or Congress.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
To be valid, a courts-martial must have personal
jurisdiction over the accused. That is, the accused must have
been subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Personal
jurisdiction is a question of "status." 96 This "status" test has
been reinforced by the Solor io decision. The accused must
possess the legal status of a servicemember , or a person
otherwise subject to the Code, before personal jurisdiction may
95 See supra note 40, and Para. 60(c)(1), Manual for Courts
Martial 1984.
9S United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles , supra note 11.
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attach. Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice* 7
delineates those persons who are subject to the Code and,
therefore, triable by courts-martial. While it is obvious that
active duty members of the armed forces are subject to courts-
martial jurisdiction, numerous arguments have been made regarding
the constitutionality of subjecting other classes of individuals
listed in Article 2 to trial by court-martial. The United States
Supreme Court has held that a "civilian" cannot be tried by
97 10 U.S.C. 802 states, in part: "Art. 2. Persons subject
to this chapter .
(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter:
(1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces,
including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their
terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of their muster or
acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of
their actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons
lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training
in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by
the terms of the call or order to obey it.
(2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen.
(3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty
training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard
of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United
States only when in Federal service.
(4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed
forces who are entitled to pay.
(5) Retired members of a reserve component who are
receiving hospitalization from an armed force.
(6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps
Reserve
.
(7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a
sentence imposed by a court-martial.
(8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations,
when assigned to and serving with the armed forces.
(9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces.
(10) In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying
an armed force in the field.
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courts-martial in peacetime. 9 '9 When and under what circumstances
would an accused be found to be a "civilian" and thus beyond the
jurisdiction of a courts-martial in time of peace? Persons
retired from the armed forces, reserve personnel not on active
duty, and persons discharged from active service fall into
categories which may appear to classify them as civilians, but
there are numerous legal arguments to the contrary. A close
examination of each of these categories of individuals is
necessary to better understand their role with respect to the
military establishment, and whether it is "necessary and proper"
for such a person to be subject to the jurisdiction of courts-
martial.
RETIRED PERSONNEL
Article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
subjects to the Code, and therefore to trial by courts-martial,
three categories of personnel who may be considered as "retired"
from active military service. Those categories are:
"(4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed
forces who are entitled to pay.
(5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving
hospitalization from an armed force, and
9e See United. States ex rel. Toth v. Queries, supra note
11; Reid v. Covert. KJnseUa v. United States ex rel, Si ngleton ,
supra note 16; Gresham v. Haaen . and McElroy v. United States ex
rel. Guaglidardo
, supra note 17.
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(6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps
Reserve . "**
The potential practical significance of these provisions are
great, perhaps even greater than Congress could have thought when
this provision was first adopted. The number of individuals in
these categories who may be subject to courts-martial
jurisdiction totaled 1,762,810 as of October 1, 1987. 10 °
Retired personnel may be placed in one of three general
categories: retired regulars; retired reserve; and members of the
Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.
Retired Regulars
Since August 3, 1861, there have been in effect at all
times, without interruption, statutes which expressly subject to
military law and trial by courts-martial retired officers of the
regular components of the Armed Forces of the United States who
are entitled to receive pay. 101 Such statutes have been held to
be constitutional. 3- 02 Since 1861 few retired personnel have been
brought to courts-martial and the subject, therefore, has not
gained much attention.
99 Article 2, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 802.
100 Based on information obtained from the office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
as of the end of FY-87. See also supra note 21.
xo:L Act of August 3, 1861, ch 42, 12 Stat. 287. (See also
Winthrop at 746-747. ) .
102 Hooper v. Hartman
r
163 F.Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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Colonel Winthrop, while expressing some doubts about
jurisdiction over civilians, stated "[t]hat retired officers are
a part of the army and so triable by court-martial - a fact
indeed never admitting of question - is adjudged in Tyler v.
U.S. , 16 Ct. CI., 223. m:lo3
The year 1916, however, marked the first time the issue of
courts-martial jurisdiction received significant attention by the
President and the Congress. When Congress revised the Articles
of War as part of a comprehensive reorganization of the military
establishment, a Senate rider eliminated the authority to subject
retired regular officers to the jurisdiction of courts-martial.
President Wilson was so concerned with the rider that he vetoed
the entire bill, 10 '* including the appropriations, thus forcing
Congress to restore the jurisdictional provisions. President
Wilson's veto message contains the most persuasive argument for
subjecting retired officers to the Code. los He started with the
argument that officers on the retired list had always been
subjected to the Articles of War. They were declared by statute
to be a part of the regular Army, were permitted to wear the
uniform, were subject to recall by the President in time of war
or national emergency, and were, therefore, to be distinguished
103 Winthrop, supra note 9 at 87. The Court of Claims
decision in Tyler was later affirmed by the Supreme Court,
holding that officers on the retired list still remained in the
service. ( United States v. Tyler , 105 U.S. 244, 245-246 (1882)).
10 * H.R. 16460, 64th Cong., 2d Sess . (1916).
" B See 53 Cong. Rec. 12844-45 (1916); See also United
States v. Hooper , 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958).
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from "mere pensioners, from whom no further military service is
expected." He continued:
"It thus appears that both the legislative and judicial
branches have drawn a sharp distinction in status between
retired officers, who are regarded and governed at all times
as an effective reserve of skilled and experienced officers
and a potential source of military strength, and mere
pensioners, from whom no further military service is
expected. Officers on the retired list of the Army are
officers of the Army, members of the Military Establishment
distinguished by their long service, and, as such, examples
of discipline to the officers and men in the active Army.
Moreover, they wear the uniform of the Army, their education
and service hold them out as persons especially qualified in
military matters to represent the spirit of the Military
Establishment, and they are subjected to active duty in
time of national emergency by the mere order of the
Commander in Chief. ... So long as Congress sees fit to
make the retired personnel a part of the Army of the United
States, the constitutionality of the proposed exemption of
such personnel from all liability under the Articles of War
is a matter of serious doubt, leaving the President, as it
does, without any means sanctioned by statute of exercising
over the personnel thus exempted the power of command vested




The last time the United States Army brought a retired
servicemember to a court-martial under this congressional
authority was in 1931 in the case of Major Kearney. 107 Major
Kearney was a retired regular Army officer who was arrested one
evening in a San Francisco hotel room for being excessively drunk
and having an unauthorized lady in his room. After his arrest,
the civilian authorities decided not to pursue any criminal
charges. The Army, however, referred his case to a general
court-martial, charging him with a violation of Article of War 95
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman). He was
convicted and sentenced to be dismissed from the service.
Although the Board of Review approved only the lesser included
offense of "conduct of a nature to bring discredit on the
service", it upheld the punishment of dismissal from the
service. a- oa Upon transmitting the record of trial to the
President, the Secretary of War recommended that the proceedings
be disapproved because, in his mind, "it establishes one of the
most dangerous precedents that has confronted the Army in its
many years of jurisprudence . . . extending] the general court-
martial system to retired officers to practically the same extent
that it does to active officers." 3- 09 In December 1931, President
Hoover disapproved the proceeding, including the sentence.
1 °'7 See Bishop, Court-Mart ial Jurisdiction over Military-
Civilian Hybrid s: Retired Regulars, Re servists, and Discharged
Prisoner
,
112 U. Pa. L.Rev. 317 (1964).
xoa 3 J.A.G.D. Board of Review 63 (1931).
109 Quoted in Bishop, supra note 107 at 339.
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Since the case of Major Kearney, neither the Army nor Air
Force has courts-martialed a retired officer or enlisted
person. 13- Studies have been undertaken to determine the
necessity of continuing court-martial jurisdiction over retired
personnel and have seriously questioned its continuing viability.
One such group reported that
M [g]ood order and discipline in the armed forces are not
benefited by continuing jurisdiction over retired members
unless they are on active duty .... The Committee
considers jurisdiction over retired members unnecessary and
recommends amendment to Article 2, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, to eliminate that jurisdiction." 111
The United States Navy, however, has not followed the
practices of the other services. In 1957, Rear Admiral Shelden
G. Hooper, who had retired in 1948, was tried by general court-
martial for committing various act of sodomy near his home in
Coronado, California, some of which involved enlisted members of
the Navy and Marine Corps. Admiral Hooper was convicted and
sentenced to be dismissed from the service and to forfeit all of
his pay and allowances. 112
Before his case was reviewed by the Court of Military
110 See generally Bishop, supra note 107. Additional
research has found no such cases .
111 Committee on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Good
Order and Discipline in the Army, Report to Honorable Wllber tL
Brucker f Secretary of the Army . 175 (1960).
112 United States v. Hooper . 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958).
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Appeals, Admiral Hooper petitioned the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California for injunctive relief and for
the convening of a three-judge court to rule on the
constitutionality of Article 2(4) of the Code. Not having
exhausted his military appellate remedies, the district court
denied relief, concluding that Article 2(4) "appears to be
constitutional without doubt, to the extent that no substantial
issue of its unconstitutionality is sufficiently presented as to
require the convening" of a three-judge court. 3- 13 This was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 3- 14
On appeal to the Court of Military Appeals, Rear Admiral
Hooper contended that jurisdiction cannot attach over retired
officers absent an order returning that officer to active
duty. 118 By statute, however, such an order could not be given
unless it was issued by the Secretary of the Navy, in time of war
or national emergency declared by the President, or with the
officer's consent. 116 The court dismissed this argument, relying
on the plain language of Article 2(4), and pointing out that an
officer recalled to active duty from the retired list would be
subject to the Code by virtue of Article 2(1), and not Article
113 Hooper v. Hartman . 163 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1958
114 Hooper v. Hartman , 274 F . 2d 429 (9th Cir . 1959).
115 United States v. Hooper , supra note 112.
116 10 U.S.C. 6481.
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2(4). xx '' Rear Admiral Hooper also argued that if Article 2(4) of
the Code is considered without reference to other provisions, it
would seem to permit a military commander to snatch a retired
regular off the streets and thrust him before a court-
mart ial . x:La The court avoided discussing the merits of this
argument but observed that this was not the case here since the
accused appeared voluntarily at the court-martial. In finding
jurisdiction, the Court of Military Appeals held that "a retired
member of a regular component of the armed forces entitled to
receive pay is a part of the 'land or naval forces' within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." 119
After finally exhausting his military remedies, Rear Admiral
Hooper unsuccessfully presented his argument to the Court of
Claims in 1961 that the termination of his pay was
unconstitutional since the court-martial which ordered the
forfeiture of his pay did not have jurisdiction over him. 120
Rear Admiral Hooper's petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court in 1964. 121 While the Supreme Court
has not recently directly addressed the amenability of retired
117 Supra note 112 at 421. Currently the Navy prohibits the
recall of a retiree to active duty solely for the purpose of
trial by courts-martial. (Paragraph 0116(c)(5), Manual of the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
)
11S Id. at 422.
119 Id., citing United States v. Tyler , 105 U.S. 244
(1882); and RunKl e V, United S tates, 19 Ct . CI. 396 (1886).
120 Hooper v T United States , 326 F.2d 982 ( Ct . Cl . 1.964).
121 Hooper v. United States
,
377 U.S. 977 (1964).
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military personnel to trial by court-martial, it quoted with
favor in 1981 the holding in United States v. Tyler that a
retired officer remains a member of the Army and continues to be
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and therefore may
forfeit his retired pay if court-martialed. 3- 22
The next Navy case involving a retired officer was that of
Lieutenant Commander Chambers, who was also charged with sodomy,
but unlike Rear Admiral Hooper, the acts occurred while the
accused was still on active duty. 123 In a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, the federal district court for the Northern
District of California concluded that "a retired officer entitled
to receive pay is not so divorced from the military as to be
considered a mere civilian" and reasoned:
"Where a retired officer has manifested his unfitness for a
return to full time military service, and has failed to
maintain proper qualifications in conformity with military
ethics and standards, it is not unreasonable to assume that
the Navy may choose to terminate his status. Undoubtedly,
such may be done by Presidential Order. Allen v. United
States
, 1950, 91 F. Supp. 933, 117 Ct . CI. 385
We believe that court-martial hearing for the purpose of
122 McCartv v. McCartv , 453 U.S. 210, 222 (1981). The
McCarty Court, in dealing with the issue of whether retired
military pay is subject to community property laws, pointed out
that such pay is for the continued services of the retiree, not
past services, since retirees remain subject to recall to active
duty and are subject to trial by courts-martial.
123 See Bishop, supra, note 107.
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discharging a retired member is also reasonably related to
the Navy's legitimate interest, based upon its concern for
discipline, in the fitness and qualifications of its retired
officers. Therefore, we conclude that the Navy may proceed
with the court-martial herein for the purpose of imposing
proper and necessary discipline." 12-*
The district court in Chambers confused the distinctions
between administrative separations, which are not in theory
supposed to be punishment and courts-martial, which are designed
to punish. The court also failed to consider the impediments on
administratively separating a retiree.
The next, and most recent, exercise of military jurisdiction
by the Navy over retired regulars was the case of Senior Chief
Radioman Michael H. Allen in 1987. 12s Senior Chief Allen retired
from the Navy in 1980 and was subsequently employed by the United
States Government as a reproduction clerk at the U.S. Naval
Telecommunications Center, Cubi Point in the Philippines. After
a lengthy investigation, Senior Chief Allen was apprehended in
the Philippines and brought to San Diego where he was tried and
12 « Chambers v. Russell, 192 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Cal.
1961)
.
123 San Diego Tribune, page B-l, April 3, 1987. The Navy
previously attempted to try a retired enlisted man and a member
of the Fleet Reserve by court-martial in 1956. The U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington granted a writ of
habeas corpus in both cases since the Navy improperly recalled
them to active duty to stand trial. United States ex rel.
Boscola v. Bledsoe , and United States ex rel. Smith v. Thomas ,




convicted by a general court-martial of, inter alia, copying and
removing classified information, in violation of written orders
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations, conspiracy and
espionage
.
While the accused challenged the jurisdiction of the court
to try him, this issue is still on appeal, awaiting action by the
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review. Although there are
admittedly only a few cases on record that address the issue of
courts-martial jurisdiction over a retired regular officer, this
is the first case where a retired enlisted person was actually
tried and convicted by a court-martial. Also at issue is the





Reserve personnel may generally be placed on the retired
list after serving a total of 20 years of combined service in
either a reserve or active duty capacity. 127 Under Article 2(5)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, retired reserve
personnel may only be subjected to the Code if they are receiving
126 As of this writing, plans were being finalized by Navy
officials to apprehend another retired enlisted person working as
a civil servant in the Philippines for offenses similar to those
in Allen
, and bring that servicemember to San Francisco for the
purpose of exercising courts-martial jurisdiction over him.
127 See generally Title 10 U.S. Code chapter 11.
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hospitalization from an armed force. 1- 23
The qualification on the statute authorizing court-martial
jurisdiction over retired reservists is based on the need of the
military commander of a military medical treatment facility to
have authority over those persons under his or her control. 129
The history of this provision does not address the need to have
some level of control over retired reservists the same as that
over retired regulars. The rationale of maintaining courts-
martial jurisdiction over retired regulars is ignored when
examining the history and rationale of exercising courts-martial
jurisdiction over retired reservists.
A retired member of a regular component of an armed force,
who by statute is always subject to courts-martial
jur isdict ion, 13 ° may be involuntarily recalled to active duty by
the Secretary of the armed force concerned in time of war or
national emergency. 131 A retired reserve member may also be
recalled to active duty without his consent, but only if the
Secretary of the armed force concerned, with the approval of the
12a p r ior to the UCMJ, the Navy had jurisdiction over
retired reservists who were placed on the same retired list as
regulars. The Code, consistent with its stated purpose,
standardized jurisdiction over such personnel by virtually
abolishing it in all three services. See S. Rep. No. 486, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949); H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 10.
12S see snedeker, Military Justice under the Code, 128
(1953) .
13Q UCMJ Art. 2(a)(2)(4), 10 U.S.C. 802 (a)(2)(4).
131 10 U.S.C. 6481-6482 (A retired regular officer may also
be recalled to active duty with his consent.).
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Secretary of Defense, determines that there are not enough
qualified reserve personnel in an active status or in the
inactive National Guard in the required category who are readily
available. 132
While the authority exists to exercise courts-martial
jurisdiction over retired reserve personnel in very limited
circumstances, this power has never been exercised. 133
Fleet Reserve
The Navy and Marine Corps have established a unique category
of "retired" personnel called members of the Fleet Reserve and
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, respectively. Active duty enlisted
personnel from the Navy and Marine Corps are generally
transferred from the active roles to the Fleet Reserve or Fleet
Marine Corps Reserve, upon their request, after serving at least
20, but not more than 30 years of active duty. 134 Active duty
enlisted members of the Navy and Marine Corps are normally
ineligible to be placed on the retired list after serving 20
years of active duty as are their Army and Air Force
counterparts, 1" but rather are placed in the Fleet Reserve or
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve until they have served a total of 30
ars of service at which time they will be transferred to theye
132 10 U.S.C. 672, 675.
133 Research in this area has revealed no such cases.




retired list. 3- 3 *
A member of the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve
may be involuntarily recalled to active duty by competent
authority not only in time of war or national emergency, but at
any other time as may be authorized by law. 137 Additionally,
such an individual may be involuntarily ordered to perform not




The first case where a Fleet Reserve member was brought
before a court-martial was in 1947 when Chief Motor Machinist
Mate Joseph Pasela was tried and convicted by a general court-
martial for bribery and conduct prejudicial to good order and
discipline in the armed forces. 3- 3 *
The accused in this case had been transferred to the Fleet
Reserve in 1939 after having served 20 years active duty in the
Navy. In 1940 he was recalled to active service, where he
remained for five years before being again released to inactive
service in the Fleet Reserve. He was then employed as a civil
servant at the Naval Submarine Base in New London, Connecticut.
136 10 U.S.C. 1031.
137 10 U.S.C. 6485.
138 Id. Prior to 1977, Members of the Fleet Reserve and
Fleet Marine Corps Reserve were required to undergo a complete
physical examination at least once each four years. Failure to
be so examined could result in that member forfeiting any pay
which may be due. (Pub.L. 95-79, see 1977 U.S. Code Cong, and
Adm. News, p. 531. ) .
139 United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno . 76 F. Supp. 203
(D. Conn. 1947) .
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During this employment, he was accused of the theft of government
property and was tried and convicted of that offense in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.
His sentence of one year and a day imprisonment and a fine of
$1800.00 was suspended, and he was placed on probation for three
years. In July 1947, the accused was recalled to active duty for
the purpose of trying him by general court-martial for charges
which grew out of the same set of circumstances involved in the
crime of theft of which Pasela was convicted in the U.S. District
Court. 3-*
After his court-martial conviction, but before sentencing,
the accused was held in the custody of the Commanding Officer of
the Naval Submarine Base in New London. While being held, Pasela
filed for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that, inter alia, he
was a civilian and therefore not subject to courts-martial
jurisdiction. The petition was initially granted, but after a
hearing, was dismissed. 141 In affirming the district court on
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
jurisdiction of the court-martial, finding that:
"The Fleet Reserve is so constituted that it falls
reasonably and readily within the phrase 'naval forces' in
the Fifth Amendment. Its membership is composed of trained
140 The general court-martial charges in Pasela included
bribery and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.
These charges required proof of elements different from the proof
required to prove theft and were, therefore, separate and




personnel who are paid on the basis of their length of
service and remain subject to call to active duty. While
keeping Fleet Reservists on such pay, Congress has, to be
sure, also allowed them to accept employment in civilian
capacities. But this need not, and does not, materially
diminish their obligations as members of the Fleet Reserve.
. . . The government at the same time obtains the benefit of
having a trained body of men subject to recall to active
duty when needed. To exclude Fleet Reservists while in
this status from a classification within the 'naval forces'
would be, we think, to construe the broad terms of the Fifth
Amendment much too narrowly . n3-+*
The second, and only other, time an individual in this
category has been subjected to courts-martial was the general
court-martial of Gunnery Sergeant Clifford Overton in 1984.
After serving approximately 22 years of active duty in the Marine
Corps, the accused was transferred to the Fleet Marine Corps
Reserve. While in this status, he was employed as a civilian
employee of the United States Government at the Naval Station,
Subic Bay, in the Republic of the Philippines. After being
apprehended for the theft of government property from the Navy
Exchange at the Naval Station in Subic Bay, permission was
obtained from the Secretary of the Navy to try the accused at a
142 United States ex rel. Pasela v. Fenno , 167 F.2d 593 (2d
Cir . 1948) .
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courts-martial . 2-* 3 Before the trial began, the accused
successfully petitioned the Court of Military Appeals for an
order to cease and desist from his further prosecution. ie
order was later vacated and the accused was tried and convicted
of larceny and conspiracy despite his vigorous objections to
jurisdiction at trial. He was sentenced to a dishonorable
discharge and to forfeit all pay and allowances.
On appeal to the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military
Review, Overton claimed that Article 2(a)(6) of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice was an unconstitutional extension of courts-
martial jurisdiction. In holding that Article 2(a)(6) did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine as an unwarranted
extension of courts-martial jurisdiction, the court found that
there was direct and substantial connection between the accused
and the Marine Corps which continued to make him part of the
"land and naval forces" which could be regulated by courts-
martial under Congress' constitutional power. 3-**
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Military Review in July 1987. While noting that
Congress' grant of jurisdiction over Fleet Marine Corps
Reservists and retirees in general is neither novel nor
arbitrary, the court pointed out that some civilian and military
3-^ 3 Section 0116(c) of the Manual of the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy requires the approval of the Secretary of the
Navy prior to exercising court-martial jurisdiction over a
retiree or member of the Fleet Reserve or Fleet Marine Corps
Reserve
.
144 United States v. Overton , 20 M.J. 998 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985).
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leaders have "expressed doubt with the wisdom of this
judgement . " :L '* B
Overton later petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari on the issue of the constitutionality of Article
2(a)(6) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. His petition
was denied on December 7, 1987, 1 '*'3 thus leaving alone Congress"
grant of courts-martial jurisdiction over members of the Fleet
Marine Corps Reserve.
RESERVE PERSONNEL
Reserve personnel are members of one of the following
reserve components of the armed forces:
The Army National Guard of the United States,
The Army Reserve,
The Naval Reserve,
The Marine Corps Reserve,
The Air National Guard of the United States,
The Air Force Reserve, or
The Coast Guard Reserve. 14 "7
The stated purpose of these reserve components is
"to provide trained units and qualified persons available
i4S United States v. Overton , 24 M.J. 309, 311 (CM. A.
1987).
146 Overton v. United States . U.S. ; 98 L.Ed 2d 485
(1987) .
147 10 U.S.C. 261.
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for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or
national emergency and at such other times as the national
security requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces
whenever, during, and after the period needed to procure and
train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the
planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than
are in the regular components . ,i3-* a
Reservists are subject to courts-martial jurisdiction while
serving on active duty 1-* 9 or during periods of inactive duty for
training, 130 but members of a state's National Guard are subject




All of the services agree that courts-martial jurisdiction
over reservists exists while they are on active duty. The Army
and the Air Force, however, as a matter of policy, exercise
courts-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(3), UCMJ only in
situations where the reservist is using expensive or dangerous
equipment
.
a- S2 The Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines may apply
Article 2(a)(3), UCMJ in all situations involving reserve
1 *° 10 U.S.C. 262.
1 *' Article 2(a)(1), U.C.M.J.
xso Art. 2(a)(3), U.C.M.J., but members of the Army National
Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the
United States are subject to the Code during periods of inactive
duty for training only when in Federal service.
151 10 U.S.C. 511.




training . 1S J
In those instances where courts-martial jurisdiction is
being exercised, the prosecution must establish that (1) the
individual was actually on active or inactive duty training; (2)
the training was performed pursuant to written orders; (3) the
orders stated that the individual was subject to the U.C.M.J.;
and (4) the individual voluntarily accepted those orders. 15 * In
the past, if the government intended to prosecute a reservist on
inactive duty training, it had to do so during a drill period
where the foregoing elements were met. 1" If the reservist's
period of active, or inactive, duty was interrupted, jurisdiction
would be lost. In United States v. Caputo
,
1Bg the accused, a
Naval reservist, committed an offense while on a two-week period
of active duty for training. Upon completion of his training and
release from that period of active duty, the government processed
charges against him. When the accused reported for his next
regularly scheduled inactive duty training, he was advised of
his rights, informed of the charges, and placed in pretrial
confinement. Although it found no constitutional deficiency in
Article 2(a)(3), U.C.M.J., the Court of Military Appeals relied
1B3 Id. See also Duncan v. Usher , 23 M.J. 29 (CM. A. 1986);
United States v. Caputo . 18 M.J. 259 (CM. A. 1984); United States
v. Schuerina . 36 C.M.R. 480 (1966).
15 * united States v, Abecnathy, supra note 151.
1BB Wallace y, Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1972); united
States v. Schuerina . 36 C.M.R. 450 (1966).
1SS 18 M.J. 259 (CM. A. 1984) .
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in part on the 1969 Manual for the proposition that once a
reservist's period of active duty training or inactive duty
training ends, and jurisdiction which the government might have
had over offenses within that period is interrupted, jurisdiction
may be saved only by several recognized exceptions, but is not
revived by a reentry into an active status.
The court also suggested that if the government had acted
with a view toward trial during the accused's two-week active
duty training, that his subsequent release would not have
terminated jur isdict ion . 1S '7 Noting some practical problems of
extending active duty training or inactive duty training status,
the court commented that Congress might wish to consider amending
the UCMJ to provide for ordering a "reservist to active duty for
purposes of court-mart ial .
"
1BS
In 1986 Congress amended both Articles 2 and 3, UCMJ. 1- * A
reservist may now be ordered to active duty involuntarily for
purposes of nonjudicial punishment, 3- 60 an Article 32
investigation, 163- or trial by courts-martial 162 for offenses
committed while on a previous period of active duty or inactive
157 Id.
1SS Id. at 267.
ls * Pub. L. 99-661, See 1986 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News,
p. 6413.
160 Art. 2(d) (1) (C), UCMJ.
161 Art. 2(d)(1)(A), UCMJ.





xs 3 A member of a regular or reserve component
remains subject to court-martial jurisdiction after leaving
active duty for offenses committed prior to such termination of
active duty if the member retains military status in a reserve
component without having been discharged from all obligations of
military service. 164 Such a person may not be tried by court-
martial for an offense committed while not on active duty or
inactive duty for training.
DISCHARGED PERSONNEL
As a general rule, once a service person is "discharged",
courts-martial jurisdiction over that person ceases, since his
status as a "member of the land and naval forces" no longer
exists. The expiration of an individual's enlistment, however,
does not automatically terminate jur isdict ion
.
1SS Article
2(a)(1), UCMJ specifically provides that servicemembers remain
subject to the Code while "awaiting discharge after expiration of
their terms of enlistment." An original term of enlistment may
be adjusted for a variety of reasons including making up lost
time for an unauthorized absence. Even after such adjustments
163 Art. 2(d)(2), UCMJ. The changes also apply to members
of the National Guard when in Federal Service.
xe + Art. 3(d), UCMJ This assumes that the member is still a
member of the armed forces.
1 s
s
United States v. Klunk , 11 C.M.R. 92 (1953); United
States v. Douse . 12 M.J. 473 (CM. A. 1982); R.C.M. 202(c)(1).
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are made, courts-martial jurisdiction normally continues past the
time of the scheduled separation until a discharge certificate or
its equivalent is delivered or until the Government fails to act
within a reasonable time after the person objects to continued
retention. The Manual for Courts-Martial provides for courts-
martial jurisdiction to continue past the scheduled expiration
date if, prior to discharge, action is initiated to try the
servicemember
.
1SS Action with a view to trial includes
apprehension, arrest, confinement, or filing of charges . 3- S7 The
Court of Military Appeals has held that if after the expiration
of an enlistment the servicemember demands discharge and no
action is taken by the government within a reasonable time to try
him, jurisdiction may not vest. 3- 68
As a general rule, actual delivery of the discharge
certificate normally terminates the status of a servicemember. 169
It is common practice to discharge a servicemember at the
expiration of a period of enlistment, or earlier, and then
immediately re-enlist him. Under what was known as the Ginyard
1SS R.C.M. 202(c) .
167 United States v. Brown . 11 M.J. 769 (N.M.C.M.R. 1981);
United States v. Hardy . 14 M.J. 402 (CM. A. 1982); United States
v. Weise
r
7 M.J. 993 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States v. Beard . 7
M.J. 452 (CM. A. 1979); United States v. Wheelev . 2 M.J. 220
(CM. A. 1979); United States v. Morrison , 22 M.J. 743 (N.M.C.M.R
1986); and United States v. Fitzpatrick . 14 M.J. 394 (CM. A.
1983) .
lsa United States v. Hutchings , 4 M.J. 190 (CM. A. 1982).
3- s * United States v. Howard . 20 M.J. 353 (CM. A. 1985).
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rule, 3- 70 any discharge terminated jurisdiction and when a
servicemember was discharged and immediately reenlisted,
jurisdiction did not exist for offenses committed during the
prior enlistment. In 1982 the Court of Military Appeals
overruled the Ginyard rule . i7:L Now, if a servicemember is
discharged solely for purposes of re-enlisting, and there is no
interruption in his military status, jurisdiction will not lapse
for offenses committed during the prior enlistment. 1,72 If there
is an intervening period where the servicemember had no "status",
then the prosecution must rely on one of the other exceptions.
Article 3, UCMJ, and Rule for Courts-Martial 202, and the
discussion that follows, provide several exceptions to the
discharge rule. The discharge of a servicemember will not bar
jurisdiction over him if he is on active duty at the time of
trial and the offense he committed, prior to that discharge, is
not triable in any civilian court and is punishable by five or
more years confinement at hard labor. The servicemember must
possess military status at the time of trial. The Supreme Court
I in Toth v. Quarles 3- 73 ruled that Article 3(a), UCMJ was
unconstitutional to the extent that it attempts to provide for
jurisdiction over individuals who were servicemembers at the time
170 United States v. Ginvard. 37 C.M.R. 132 (1967).
3- 71 13 M.J. 308 (CM. A. 1982) .
172 See United States v. Moore . 22 M.J. 523 (N.M. C.M.R.
1986) .
173 350 U.S. 11 (1955) .
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of the offense but are civilians at the time of trial.
As a practical matter, an actual interruption of active duty
precludes jurisdiction because most offenses which authorize more
than five years confinement are also civilian offenses and are
triable in a state or federal court. Purely military offenses
generally do not meet the five-year confinement requirement.
This new exception, however, would have significant affect in a
case like that of United States v. Wheeler . 174 In Wheeler , the
accused committed a murder while on active duty and stationed in
Germany, just before he was sent back to the United States and
transferred to the inactive reserves. With no extraterritorial
jurisdiction, this offense could not be tried in the United
States civilian courts.
Article 3(b), UCMJ also provides for jurisdiction over an
individual who has been discharged but obtained that discharge
fraudulently. This provision further states that if convicted
for the fraudulent discharge, the individual may also be tried
for any offenses committed prior to the discharge.
Courts-martial jurisdiction also exists over servicemembers
who have deserted and were later able to obtain a discharge. 3- 73
The discharge does not relieve the servicemember of
accountability for the offense of desertion . a- 7S
17 « 28 C.M.R. 212 (1959) (Note: Because the accused feared
the possibility of extradition to Germany, he volunteered to be
recalled to active duty and stand trial by court-martial.).
17B Art. 3(b) UCMJ.
176 See United States v. Huff . 22 C.M.R. 37 (1956).
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Additionally, a servicemember convicted by courts-martial
who receives a sentence which includes a punitive discharge and
confinement may receive delivery of that discharge while serving
the confinement portion of the sentence. Article 2(a)(7), UCMJ
provides, in effect, that the discharge will not relieve that
individual of courts-martial jurisdiction if, while in custody,
he commits an offense. This provision has been deemed valid by
both the Court of Military Appeals 1 "7 "7 and the federal courts . 1 '7a
RAMIFICATIONS OF RECENT DECISIONS
ANALYSIS AND RATIONALE
Most recently, the Supreme Court has established that the
issue of "status" is solely determinative of courts-martial
jurisdiction. If an individual has the requisite status; that
is, the person can be considered to be a member of the "land and
naval forces", then he can be tried by court-martial for any
offense under the Code without regard to service connection. In
overruling the | Callahan service connection requirement, the
Supreme Court has given courts-martial unlimited authority to try
any offense under the Code as long as the accused has the
17 "7 Peelbes v.Frpehlke , 46 C.M.R. 266 (1973); United States
v. Ragan f 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963).
178 Ragan v. Cox . 320 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1963).
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requisite status and the offense is cognizable under the UCMJ
.
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the Solor io
decision returns courts-martial jurisdiction to pre Q ' Callahan
status. Under the pre ' Callahan jurisdictional rules the
military did not exercise jurisdiction over all non-service
connected offenses. Initially, jurisdiction was exercised only
in those situations where it was determined necessary by the
military commander to ensure good order and discipline. The
decades just prior to O'Callahan , however, showed an increasing
tendency for military authorities to exercise a greater degree of
subject matter jurisdiction. This increased exercise of military
jurisdiction was often with the active concurrence of the
civilian authorities. 179 After the O'Callahan decision f the
military justice system responded immediately by dropping an
unreported and unknown number of prosecutions for non-service
connected offenses, and numerous convictions under initial review
were reversed. 180
It is unlikely, however, that, as a result of Solor io
,
the
military will respond as dramatically as it did to the decision
in O'Callahan . While the broad authority granted by the Solor io
decision could significantly increase the military's exercise of
courts-martial jurisdiction over non-service connected offenses,
a more reasoned, conservative approach can be expected. An
179 See generally, Birnbaum and Fowler, Military Appellate
Decision s Following O'Callahan v. Parker
,






informal memo from the Navy's Office of the Judge Advocate
General suggests that "for policy reasons, jurisdiction should
not be asserted in some cases". 181 While the "policy reasons"
were not defined, a primary consideration must be the adverse
appearance which may be created by exercising too great a degree
of jurisdiction. Such a practice, if viewed as an abuse, could
prompt Congressional or judicial limitations on the exercise of
courts-martial jurisdiction. Another factor, which could support
such a "policy reason" is that of the military setting a
precedent with the civilian authorities that all offenses
committed by servicemembers will be tried by courts-martial, and
therefore civilian authorities may be reluctant to prosecute when
they may feel the military will exercise jurisdiction. The
military, on the other hand, may not see the exercise of courts-
martial jurisdiction in all cases necessary to ensure good order
and discipline.
The military authorities must use a reasoned approach in the
decision whether to exercise jurisdiction. Of primary concern is
the needs of the military to ensure good order and discipline.
If the exercise of courts-martial jurisdiction will not promote
good order and discipline, then alternatives should be explored.
With respect to in personam jurisdiction, the literal
181 Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
informal memorandum dated July 1987.
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reading of the last sentence of the Solor io holding 102 does more
than just simply return courts-martial jurisdiction to pre
0' Callahan status. The last sentence, if read literally, returns
courts-martial jurisdiction to the pre Toth era, permitting the
military to exercise jurisdiction over discharged servicemembers
.
In showing "particular deference to the determinations of
Congress" 1 * 3 in establishing those categories of persons subject
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Supreme Court and
the lower courts have been reluctant to find the provisions of
Article 2, UCMJ, conferring jurisdiction over certain
individuals, unconstitutional. Owing to the importance of
maintaining an effective military to insure national security, it
has been held that Congress* power to make rules for the land and
naval forces must be especially broad. 10 " Such interpretations
and rulings have not only enabled Congress to broaden the scope
of courts-martial jurisdiction, but courts have even suggested
areas in which the expansion should occur. 189
When addressing Congress' grant of courts-martial authority
over certain classes of individuals, and whether this grant is
182
"We therefore hold that the requirements of the
Constitution are not violated where, as here, a court-martial is
convened to try a serviceman who was a member of the armed
services at the time of the offense charged ." (Emphasis added.)
Solorio v. United States , supra note 19.
183 Middendorf v. Henry , 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976); Schlesinqer
v. Counselman
r
420 U.S. 738, 757-8 (1975).
i8 « cur cy y, s ecretary o f th e Acmy, 595 F.2d 873 (d.c. cir.
1979) .
185 See e.g. United States v. Caputo f 18 M.J. 259 (CM. A. 1984)
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"the least possible power adequate to the end proposed, M:Lac the
courts have reasoned that, in addition to active duty personnel,
retirees and reservists make up a pool of available manpower
that can be called upon to serve our country in time of war or
national emergency and, therefore, must be subject to military
control. The century old holding of the Supreme Court that the
normal repositories of the power to try persons for offenses
against the United States are the civilian courts and that
courts-martial jurisdiction should be exercised in only very
limited and extraordinary situations as a very narrow exception
to the preferred method of trial in civilian courts has more
recently given way to the judiciary's deference to Congress. 187
In an exercise of maximum deference, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia stated that "it is plainly for Congress
to decide which categories of retired members of the Armed Forces
should be subject to the Code." iaa
It was Congress' own intent at the time the Uniform Code of
Military Justice was established that the Code provide uniformity
in substance and uniformity in interpretation and
construction. 1 ** While Congress has decided which classes of
persons should be subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, and at what times, it is difficult to follow their
iae United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles , supra note 11.
3- a7 Reid y, Covert, supra note 13.
188 Taussig v. McNamara , 219 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. 1963).
ia * See supra note 23.
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reasoning. Regular retirees, including those retired due to a
permanent physical disability, 19 ° are subject to the Code at all
times because, it has been reasoned, they are subject to recall
to active duty without their consent in time of war or national
emergency. It is doubtful, however, that a person in this
category who was retired under a full physical disability would
be recalled to active duty to perform service in time of war, yet
this person remains subject to the Code. Retired reserves are
also subject to involuntary recall to active duty in time of war
or national emergency, but they are only subject to the Code
while receiving hospitalization from an armed force. As
previously discussed, this limitation is based on the military
hospital commander's need to have control over those he is
treating. While the commander of the military hospital is
responsible for enforcing discipline over those members of the
military who are receiving treatment in the facility he commands,
he has no similar authority over civilians or dependents
receiving treatment in time of peace. No consideration is given
to the fact that retired reserves, like retired regulars, form a
pool of available manpower which can be called upon when needed.
If there is such a concern that a retired reserve should be
subject to the code while receiving hospitalization from an armed
force, why is there not equal concern when that individual enters
a military enclave for purposes of shopping at the exchange store
190 No distinction is made in Article 2 of the Code between
those retired for length of service and those retired due to a
permanent physical disability under 10 U.S.C. Chapter 61.
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and commissary, patronizing one of the service clubs, or for some
other reason? A retired reserve's unlawful conduct in one of
these situations can be just as detrimental to good order and
discipline in the armed forces as such conduct would be in a
military hospital, especially if such conduct occurred outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Members of
the reserve components of the armed forces are subject to the
Code only while on active duty, active duty for training, or
inactive duty training, yet they, too, make up part of the pool
of available manpower to be called upon in time of war or
national emergency. If the rationale for retaining courts-
martial jurisdiction at all times over retired regulars is that
they are a part of a pool of available manpower to be called upon
in time of war or national emergency, then why aren't the other
components of this pool equally subject to courts-martial
jurisdiction? The Army and the Air Force, as a matter of policy,
exercise courts-martial jurisdiction over reservists under
Article 2(a)(3) of the Code only in situations where the
reservist is using expensive or dangerous equipment. The Navy,
Marine Corps and Coast Guard apply Article 2(a)(3) in all
situations involving reserve training. 191 Since reservists form
the probable first group of individuals to be recalled to active
duty in time of war or national emergency, it would seem to make
sense that they, more than the other groups, should be subject to
191 See United States v. Abernathy
,
48 C.M.R. 205, 206
(C.G.C.M.R. 1974) and United States v. Caputo , supra note 185
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the Code at all times.
The aim of Congress to have uniformity in substance and
uniformity in interpretation and construction has not been
fulfilled. Why, then, is there such an inconsistent application
of courts-martial jurisdiction to these groups of individuals as
Justice Douglas observed in ' Callahan ? With respect to
exercising jurisdiction over reservists and retired reservists
the answer is most probably related to the strong lobbying
efforts in Congress on the part of various reserve
organizations. 192 It was the Senate, after hearing testimony
from these groups, that recommended against court-martial
jurisdiction over reservists unless they were using dangerous or
expensive equipment, reasoning that there was no need to exercise
courts-martial jurisdiction over them unless personal safety or
the loss of expensive government equipment was at issue. 193
We have seen the Supreme Court, the lower courts, and even
the President of the United States, define the status of a
retiree as a member of the armed forces who receives pay, not as
a mere pensioner but, for continued services. If this is true,
then it should follow that a retiree who is administratively
removed from this pool of available manpower should not be
eligible to receive pay for continued services. This is not the
case. In what is referred to as the "Tower Amendment", retirees,
See Bishop, supra note 107
193 See S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess . 4-5, 1949;




and those servicemembers eligible for retirement, are entitled to
receive retirement pay based upon the highest pay grade
successfully held, notwithstanding the fact that they may be
administratively discharged, and therefore ineligible to be
recalled to active duty. 3- 94* The pay received by a person in this
category can hardly be considered as pay for future services, but
is more related to the pay received by a pensioner. The Tower
Amendment permits the forfeiture of retired pay and benefits if
the servicemember is awarded a punitive discharge as part of a
courts-martial sentence. However, if an enlisted person serving
in a higher pay grade, eligible for retirement, is sentenced by a
courts-martial to be reduced to the lowest pay grade, but is not
awarded a punitive discharge, that person would be retired at the
lowest pay grade but entitled to receive retired pay at the
highest pay grade successfully held. If subsequently recalled to
active duty, it would be in the lowest pay grade. It is not
consistent to regard his retirement pay as pay for future
services when the future services are performed in a pay grade
substantially lower than that for which he was paid on
retirement. The Tower Amendment has, therefore, seriously
weakened the position that retirement pay represents pay for
future services.
The fact that courts-martial jurisdiction currently exists
over retirees, and that Solor io has eliminated the service
194 See 10 U.S.C. 1186(b)(1); 10 U.S.C. 1401a(f); Pub.L. 96
513, Title I, Sec. 110, Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2874. See also
1980 U.S. Code Cong., & Ad. News, p. 6333.
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connection requirement, several hypothetical situations could
provide interesting results. Is a retiree subject to the
military grooming and haircut standards? Are retirees bound to
comply with all lawful general regulations issued by flag or
general officers in command? 195 Such an order could include
patronizing a business establishment that has been placed "off
limits" by the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Review Board.
While the current state of the law provides that a retiree could
be tried by courts-martial for a violation of one of these
offenses, such an exercise of jurisdiction is not consistent with
"restricting military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction
deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among the
troops in active service . M:L9,= Wouldn't this be the same as
"snatching off the streets" a retiree for a minor civilian
offense as suggested in Hooper ? 3- 9 7
It is clear that the original intent of Congress to provide
uniformity in substance and uniformity in interpretation and
construction has failed. Congress' rationale in granting
jurisdiction over various classes of individuals, and the
application by the various armed services of these grants of
193 Article 92, UCMJ, requires all persons subject to the
Code to obey all lawful general orders and regulations.
Knowledge of the order or regulation is not an element of the
offense which needs to be alleged or proved. (See paragraph 16
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984)
3- 9S United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles , supra note 11.
197 While Admiral Hooper's offense was quite serious, he
argued that the broad grant of jurisdiction over retirees could
be extended to include minor offenses.
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jurisdiction is not consistent. The time has come to take a new
look at the question of exercising jurisdiction over retirees and
reservists and whether or not the effect of Solor io should be
modified by Congressional action or implementing regulations by
the armed forces.
Retroactivity of Solorio
While the Supreme Court made it clear that any offense under
the Code could be tried by courts-martial without regard to
service connection if the accused has the proper status, it left
unsettled the question of the application of Solorio to persons
who committed offenses prior to Solor io which may not have
withstood the test of "service-connection." The fact that
certiorari was denied the following day in three cases which were
being held in abeyance by the Supreme Court pending the decision
in Solorio , as they dealt with challenges to courts-martial
jurisdiction over off-base offenses similar to those offenses
committed by Solorio, is indicative that the ruling in Solorio is
retroactive. 1 * 8 However, the retroactive effect of Solor io is
198 Puskaric v. United States , U.S. , 97 L.Ed. 2d 762
(1987); Jenkins v. United States , Id.; Abell v. United States ,
Id. (No. 86-953) Note also that the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Military Review recently affirmed the case of United States v.
McNamara
r
No. 86-3714 (N.M.C.M.R. 13 July 1987), by applying
Solorio to find subject matter jurisdiction. In United States
v. Starks
r
M.J. , A.C.M.R. 86-01434 (July 1987), the Army




still an open question with the Court of Military Appeals. ;LS *
It would make sense that since Solor io neither impacts on
whether an offense was committed nor increases the punishment
available for offenses previously committed, it should be
retroactively applied. In comparison, ' Callahan was not
retroactively applied. 200 The Supreme Court determined the
retroactivity of O'Callahan by applying the criteria announced in
Stovall v. Denno : 203- (a) the purpose to be served by the new
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards. The Supreme Court found that the rule in O'Callahan
did not remedy a defect in the truth-determining process, that
there was extensive and justifiable reliance by the military
authorities on the old standard and they acted appropriately
based on that standard, and that applying ' Callahan would
adversely affect the administration of justice by creating havoc.
Solor io does not remedy a defect in the truth-determining
process, military authorities have continually asserted the
greatest possible jurisdiction over offenses committed by a
servicemember , and a servicemember ' s reliance on ' Callahan to
199 A discussion with the Honorable Walter Cox, Associate
Justice, Court of Military Appeals, on March 30, 1988, revealed
that his court has not yet had to deal with this issue and this
issue may be difficult to decide.
200 Gosa v. Mayden
,
supra note 7.
201 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1966) .
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commit an offense which is a crime under the Code but which he
perceives as not "service-connected" is neither justifiable nor
appropriate, and there is no adverse effect on the administration
of justice in applying Solor io retroactively. Therefore, using
the analysis of Gosa , retroactive effect would not cause the same
impact as O'Callahan.
Solorio, however, argued in his petition to the Supreme
Court that applying a more expansive subject matter jurisdiction
test to him than had been announced previously violated his
rights under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As
this argument was first raised on appeal to the Supreme Court and
he failed to offer any explanation as to why he failed to raise
the issue before the Court of Military Appeals, the Supreme Court
declined to consider the claim.
The argument remains that the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the courts that
the ex post facto clause of the Constitution imposes on Congress.
Arguably, because Congress could not by statute have
retroactively expanded courts-martial jurisdiction to reach an
accused's commission of offenses not service-connected prior to
the decision in Solorio , the Supreme Court can not achieve this
result through its decision in Solorio . The crux of the issue is
whether applying the rule in Solorio would be a retroactive
application of an unforeseeable judicial expansion of the
substantive scope of a criminal statute. To be prohibited and a
violation of an accused's due process rights, it must reach
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conduct that the accused could not have reasonably believed was
criminal at the time he engaged in that conduct. 202 The decision
in Solor io does not change the elements of any offense under the
Code so as to deny the accused fair warning of the crime
prohibited .
Service connection is unrelated to whether a crime has been
committed or not. A servicemember is on notice that the Uniform
Code of Military Justice makes certain conduct criminal. The
fact that under the 'Callahan and Relf ord factors the military
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense did not make
his conduct any less criminal, nor did it change the fact that
personal jurisdiction over the servicemember existed. For a
servicemember to state that he engaged in conduct which was
criminal but in a manner which he perceived to preclude trial by
courts-martial because the service connection factors did not
exist is not justifiable reliance, nor has the servicemember been
deprived of any defense to the particular offense. It appears,
therefore, that the holding in Solor io should be applied
retroactively
.
EFFECTS ON THE SYSTEM
It is too early at this time to assess the full impact on
the criminal justice system of the Solor io decision and the
202 See Bouie v. City of Columbia , 378 U.S. 347 (1964);
Marks v. United States . 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
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Court's seeming tolerance of Congress' expansion of courts-
martial jurisdiction. 203
The services and the United States Court of Military Appeals
are currently studying the impact and preparing for what could
result in a significant increase in caseload. For the first time
in over 30 years the Court of Military Appeals has appointed a
special committee to examine the court's role and recommend
changes as a result of the Solor io decision. 204 In addition to
examining how the court can better adapt to the Supreme Court's
expansion of courts-martial subject matter jurisdiction, the
committee will also assess the impact on the Court of Military
Appeals of the recent congressional enactments expanding
jurisdiction over reservists in certain situations. Concerned
about the potential increase in the number of courts-martial
cases, and the time and expense involved in the prosecution of
these cases, the services have begun documenting those cases
which, prior to Solor io , would not be "service connected". 205
This impact assessment is considered necessary for the services
to plan future manpower and resource requirements.
203 Attempts to obtain statistical data from the offices of
the Judge Advocates General of the armed services were
unsuccessful. Although all of the services indicated they were
monitoring the effects of the Solor io decision, meaningful data
and conclusions could not be obtained at this time.
2 °* Navy Times , p. 51, November 16, 1987. The last time
such a committee was formed to examine the court's role was
shortly after the Court of Military Appeals was established.
205 Commander, Naval Legal Service Command, Alexandria,
Virginia message 312230Z July 1987.
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The Pasela case suggests a problem of double jeopardy which
is magnified by the decision in Solor io . While the facts in
Pasela demonstrate that the civilian and military prosecutions
involved different offenses, the expansive effect of Solor io
raises new questions. Fortunately, a "Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Department of Justice and the
Department of Defense Relating to the Investigation and
Prosecution of Certain Crimes, August 1984" 20S requires close
coordination between those two departments to eliminate the
possibility of double jeopardy. With respect to the prosecution
of the same offense by separate sovereigns, local memoranda
similar to that between the Departments of Justice and Defense
would seem appropriate. 20 "7
Benefits and Burdens
At first, it may appear that any expansion of courts-martial
jurisdiction works only an advantage on the civilian criminal
justice system and both a benefit and a burden on the military
establishment. By subjecting more individuals to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, the civilian criminal justice system
may well feel able to defer most prosecutions to the military
unless they have some significant overriding interest in
206 See appendix 3, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984 .
207 The Navy has a policy not to prosecute a case which has
been adjudicated in a civilian court without first obtaining the
permission of the Secretary of the Navy. (Paragraph 0116, Manual




prosecuting the case. With jail overcrowding, unmanageable court
dockets, limited personnel resources and tight budgets for
expenses related to trial and witnesses, civilian authorities may
view this expansion of courts-martial jurisdiction as a partial
answer to their problems. Civilian authorities may reason that
if they refuse to prosecute a member of the military, the
military will try the offense by courts-martial. The military
authorities, however, may decide that it is not in their best
interests to exercise jurisdiction.
The services may view this expansion of jurisdiction as a
victory in giving the military commander greater authority over
those servicemembers under his control. The authority may be
necessary to ensure good order and discipline within the unit and
to maintain a high state of morale and readiness. But along with
this benefit comes its burdens. The money, manpower and
facilities saved by the civilian system, should they refuse to
prosecute, would be absorbed by the military establishment if the
military commander determined that trial by courts-martial was
appropriate. Does the military really want to prosecute all
members of the land and naval forces for all offenses? A
military unit preparing to deploy overseas on a ship or begin
extended field maneuvers may not want to be burdened with the
prosecution of a marginal performing servicemember charged with a
"civilian" offense. The commander of such a military unit, in
considering these factors, may find it in the best interest of
good order and discipline not to take on this additional
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prosecution burden when the civilian authorities could prosecute
the case. The military could then resort to administrative
discharge proceedings to remove him from the military rolls.
A benefit/burden analysis cannot be confined to the two
separate criminal justice systems. The analysis must also
consider the impact on society as a whole.
The range of punishments which may be imposed by courts-
martial are extremely limited when compared to that of a civilian
criminal court. Punishments imposed by courts-martial fall into
four general categories: punitive discharge, confinement or
restraint, forfeitures or fine, and reduction in pay grade. 208
Unlike civilian criminal courts, courts-martial may not suspend a
sentence, order restitution, order probation, or commit an
individual to a mental institution. The military is ill equipped
to provide the necessary correctional programs which are
available in the civilian community.
THE LIMITS OF EXPANSION
While the Court in Toth would "restrict military tribunals
to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to
maintaining discipline among the troops in active service", we
have more recently seen the Supreme Court give particular
deference to those acts of Congress which establish the




for exercising jurisdiction over certain groups of individuals is
difficult to follow, courts have held that Congress' power to
make these determinations is especially broad. 209
With the Court's apparent "hands off" approach in
interfering with Congress' grants of courts-martial jurisdiction
pursuant to Article I, the Court has left the determination for
any expansion up to Congress. It is doubtful, absent a clear
showing of abuse, that the Court will restrict Congress'
determinations of what is necessary.
The Needs of the Services
It is vitally important to maintain a separate system of
justice for the military in order to maintain good order and
discipline to provide for an effective fighting force. This
system of justice must be efficient and effective, but not
unnecessarily overburdened. The military services must be able
to exercise jurisdiction over those offenses and those persons it
deems necessary in order to ensure good order and discipline.
The original aim of Congress in establishing the Uniform Code of
Military Justice to provide for uniformity is a noble one.
Unfortunately, the rationale of Congress in determining which
individuals should be subject to the Code, and the application of
the jurisdictional grants by the various branches of the armed
services is anything but uniform. The time has come to take a
209 See Curry v. Secretary of the Army , supra note 25;
Taussig v. McNamara . 219 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. 1963).
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new look at the advisability of exercising jurisdiction over the
various classes of individuals in an effort to provide uniformity
in rationale, construction and application. It is also
appropriate to examine the effects of the Solor io decision to
determine if limiting legislation or regulations should be
implemented
.
While the Supreme Court has granted broad discretionary
powers to the military in the exercise of courts-martial
jurisdiction, the full exercise of these powers is not necessary
to ensure good order and discipline.
Retired regulars, retired reserves, and reserve personnel
all fulfill a vital role in our national defense. As members of
our nation's pool of inactive duty manpower resources they must
be monitored to ensure they are ready and fit to be called upon
to serve their country in time of war or national emergency.
Those who, by reason of their misconduct, are no longer fit to so
serve should be removed from this pool. If that misconduct is
detrimental to good order and discipline in the armed forces,
then prosecution by courts-martial is necessary to serve the
needs of the military. If, on the other hand, the misconduct had
no adverse effect on good order and discipline, then
administrative proceedings should be held to determine the
continued fitness of that person to serve in our nation's pool of
available resources.
Under current laws and regulations, reserve personnel may be
discharged administratively if they are no longer suited for
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military service. 23- Once discharged, they would be entitled to
no further compensation from the United States based on their
service, unless for disabilities incurred while on active
duty. 211 Retired personnel, however, may be administratively
discharged but, as a result of the Tower Amendment, would
continue to receive retired pay. If they are removed from the
rolls by sentence of a court-martial, however, they would forfeit
their right to receive retired pay. 212 If retired pay is truly
compensation for future services, then that provision of the
Tower Amendment which effectively gives the retiree a vested
interest in his retired pay, unless punitively discharged by
order of a courts-martial, should be repealed. Since all
retirees may not be recalled to active duty, it appears that
retired pay is not solely compensation for future services but a
combination of compensation for future services and a pension.
Either way, if military authorities want to take away the pay of
a retiree for reason of misconduct, an administrative discharge
is ineffective, and, the military would normally have to resort
to a trial by courts-martial. 23- 3 The Tower Amendment, therefore,
forces the military authorities to impose criminal sanctions
against a retiree to achieve this end, when administrative
210 10 U.S.C. 1162.
211 Id.
212 Note that 5 U.S.C. 8312 provides for the termination of
retired pay if an individual is convicted of certain serious
offenses against the United States.
213 But see Id.
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proceedings may be more appropriate.
In order to cure these inequities, the provisions of the
Tower Amendment which were previously discussed should be
amended. The military services need the ability to exercise
courts-martial jurisdiction over all classes of persons
considered to be members of the land and naval forces. This
includes retired regulars as well as retired reserves and reserve
personnel. With respect to these individuals, however,
jurisdiction should be limited to those offenses which are
detrimental to good order and discipline. The twelve criteria
cited under Relf ord , to assist in determining if service
connection exists, would be helpful in determining if the conduct
was of a nature to be detrimental to good order and discipline in
the armed forces, and should be used for this purpose. If the
misconduct by one of these persons not on active duty does not
meet the criteria cited under Relf ord , then other action, short
or trial by courts-martial, may be appropriate.
With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the holding in
Solor io gives the military the necessary flexibility to exercise
jurisdiction over those offenses deemed necessary to prosecute in
order to maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces
without the cumbersome burden of proving service connection. The
broad latitude granted in Solor io , however, must be exercised






Not only has the Court shown great deference to the
enactments of Congress relating to courts-martial jurisdiction,
but the Court has shown its willingness to expand this
jurisdiction even further.
The last sentence in Solor io
,
which states: "We therefore
hold that the requirements of the Constitution are not violated
where as here, a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman
who was a. member of the armed services a_t the time of the
offenses charged . " (emphasis added) indicates a willingness to
overrule United States ex rel. Toth v. Quar les
r
2X " which held
that "court-martial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach any
person not a member of the Armed Forces at the time of both the
offense and the trial. Thus, Discharged soldiers cannot be
court-martialed for offenses committed while in the service." 21- 5
It appears that if presented with this question, the Supreme
Court would overrule Toth and conclude that there is jji personam
jurisdiction .
The Supreme Court appears unlikely to oppose expansion of
courts-martial jurisdiction over reservists or retired
reservists. The rationale for expanding jurisdiction to these
individuals at all times is certainly consistent with the Court's
previous holdings with respect to retired personnel. It appears
unlikely, however, that Congress will expand jurisdiction in this
2:L-




area over the strong objections of the powerful lobbyists
representing the various reserve groups.
CONCLUSION
Solor io has made the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
before courts-martial virtually moot for all offenses occurring
on or after June 25, 1987. The question of retroactivity will
linger until this issue is ultimately determined. One of the
most significant questions left unanswered is when and under what
circumstances would an accused be found to be a "civilian" and
thus beyond the jurisdiction of a courts-martial in time of
peace. This issue seems destined to become the subject of
increased litigation, and should become the subject of
Congressional enactments.
The expansive effect of Solor io raises significant questions
of double jeopardy. While the Department of Defense currently
has a memorandum of understanding relating to the prosecution of
offenses with the Department of Justice to prevent such an issue,
similar memoranda of understanding should be established on a
local level with the cognizant civilian prosecutorial authorities
to work out the issues of double prosecution.
The Code provisions relating to personal jurisdiction are
neither uniform nor equal in substance, interpretation and
application as originally intended by Congress. The
justification for exercising jurisdiction over regular retirees

is not applied when considering reservists or retired reservists.
The exercise of jurisdiction by the various services is far from
uniform. The Army and Air Force find it unnecessary to exercise
court-martial jurisdiction over retirees, and only exercise
jurisdiction over reservists if they are working with expensive
or dangerous equipment. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,
on the other hand, exercise jurisdiction over these groups.
The case of United States v. Allen will give the review
courts an opportunity to address, for the first time, the
exercise of jurisdiction over a retired enlisted person. Also at
issue is the applicability of written orders and regulations over
retirees
.
While the Supreme Court has left the determination to
Congress to decide which groups of personnel should be subject to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress has abandoned its
original aim of uniformity. Subjecting regular retirees to the
Code for even the most unrelated offense to the military, while
disregarding the reservist or retired reserve who may commit a
serious offense against the military while on a military
reservation does not meet the overall needs of the military
services to maintain good order and discipline nor is its
application uniform.
If it is perceived that servicemembers are being tried for
minor "civilian" offenses and, therefore, in the words of Justice
Marshall in his Solor io dissent, being "deprived of procedural
protections constitutionally mandated in trials for purely
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civilian offenses, M2L8 Congress may decide to pass legislation
limiting jurisdiction to service connected offenses.
A more logical approach would be for Congress to undertake a
comprehensive review of the needs of the military establishment
and pass uniform legislation to meet these special needs.
Authority should be granted to provide for the discharge and
forfeiture of the retired pay of retirees who commit gross acts
of misconduct which are prejudicial to good order and discipline
in the armed forces, so as not to force the military services to
resort to trial by court-martial to attain the goal of removing
that individual from the rolls of the service with a
corresponding loss of pay.
While some may view Solor io as a conclusion to the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, the question as to the outer limits
of courts-martial jurisdiction in general remains an open
question
.
Solorio v. United States , supra note 19.
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